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LAW & POLITICS
REORDERING THE PRIORITIES OF THE
FBI IN LIGHT OF THE END OF THE
COLD WAR
DON EDWARDS*
I. INTRODUCTION
In San Diego early last year, due to a lack of agents assigned
to white collar crime, the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("Bu-
reau" or "FBI") was unable to investigate bank fraud cases involv-
ing losses of less than one million dollars.' Nationwide, the Bureau
had 21,000 unaddressed referrals of possible savings and loan
fraud, and at least 2,400 inactive financial crimes investigations.2
In 1989, the FBI had the resources to investigate only forty per-
cent of the drug trafficking organizations that it had identified.'
Yet at the same time, the Bureau sent an agent to the home of
a 73-year-old grandmother in Phoenix to ask why she had written
a letter to the Soviet embassy.4 She told them that she wanted to
* Member of the House of Representatives (D-California); Chairman, Subcommittee
on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary. I gratefully
acknowledge the invaluable contribution of Subcommittee Assistant Counsel, James X.
Dempsy, in the preparation of this Article.
1 FBI Oversight and Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 1991: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st
Cong., 2d Seass. 437-38 (1990) [hereinafter FBI Oversight-1991] (testimony of FBI Director
William S. Sessions).
2 THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S WAR AGAINST FRAUD, ABUSE, AND MISCONDUCT IN FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS: WINNING SOME BATTLES BUT LOSING THE WAR, REPORT OF THE HOUSE COMM.
ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, H.R. REP. No. 982, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1990).
3 FBI Oversight and Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 1990: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 180 (1989) (testimony of FBI Assistant Director Floyd I. Clarke).
4 Montini, FBI Visit on Letter, Soviet Magazine Makes Grandma See Red, ARIZ. RE-
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thank the Soviets for sending an icebreaker to free two whales
trapped in an Alaskan icecap. As part of the same program, the
FBI has sent agents, sometimes in teams, to interview schoolchil-
dren who had written to the Soviet embassy seeking information
for class projects, Amnesty International members who had written
on behalf of political prisoners, and a retiree who had asked the
Soviet consulate in San Francisco for brochures on group tours of
the Soviet Union.5 From 1985 through 1987, under the related "Li-
brary Awareness Program," the FBI sent agents into university li-
braries asking for information on foreign nationals who were read-
ing technical journals.6 And in the mid-1980's, the Bureau
interviewed approximately one hundred American travelers to Nic-
aragua, including a number involved in humanitarian efforts.7
The FBI, the nation's premier law enforcement agency, is also
our lead domestic counterintelligence agency. At its core, counter-
intelligence involves identifying and neutralizing unlawful espio-
nage, sabotage, or terrorism efforts of foreign powers. But the
FBI's counterintelligence efforts never have been confined to the
investigation of illegal activities. The FBI has long claimed the au-
thority to investigate lawful activities-including the first amend-
ment activities of United States citizens-involving contact with or
support for a foreign nation or group.8
Lacking a clear-cut focus on criminal conduct, the FBI's
counterintelligence jurisdiction has justified many of the Bureau's
most troublesome intrusions on first amendment rights. In the
1960's and 1970's, the FBI maintained the dangerous COINTEL-
PRO program 9 and waged a shameful campaign against Martin
PUBLIC, Apr. 7, 1989, reprinted in FBI Investigation of First Amendment Activities: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 89 (1989) [hereinafter Subcomm. Hearings on FBI Investi-
gation of First Amendment Activities].
5 See Subcomm. Hearings on FBI Investigation of First Amendment Activities, supra
note 4, at 85-111.
1 FBI Counterintelligence Visits to Libraries: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil
and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 3
(1988) [hereinafter FBI Library Visits] (testimony of Duane Webster, Executive Director,
Association of Research Libraries).
FBI Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 1986: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
7-18, 22, 29-30 (1986) (testimony of then FBI Director William H. Webster).
8 See infra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
9 Among COINTELPRO's operations was COINTELPRO-New Left, which was di-
rected against college campus groups and opponents of America's involvement in the Viet-
nam conflict. The operation was so vaguely defined that it resulted in the targeting of legiti-
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Luther King.10 More recently, the FBI's investigation of the Com-
mittee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador ("CISPES")
became, by the FBI's own admission, wastefully overbroad, as it
compiled information on thousands of innocent individuals and
peaceful groups."
The breathtaking changes in East-West relations have gener-
ated a reexamination of the shape and mission of United States
military and foreign intelligence programs.12 The war in the Per-
sian Gulf, which brought together as partners, at least temporarily,
the United States and the Soviet Union, confirms the significance
of the Berlin Wall's demolition. War and conflict will still exist,
and new threats to United States national security will be identi-
fied, but the strategies and principles that guided the Pentagon,
and the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA") since the end of
World War II have become obsolete. Consequently, there is now a
serious effort underway to reexamine and reorder America's na-
tional security policy in light of the dissolution of the East Bloc
mate, non-violent anti-war groups. Another aspect was COINTELPRO-Black Nationalist,
which targeted Black civil rights groups, including ones involved exclusively in non-violent
political expression. See generally SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT To INTELLIGENCE ACTvTms, FINAL REPORT, Book II: Intelligence Activities
and the Rights of Americans and Book III: Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelli-
gence Activities and the Rights of Americans, S. REP. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 163
(1976) [hereinafter CHURCH COMM. REP.].
10 Id. Book Ill, at 79-184.
" The CISPES organization, founded in the early 1980's, protested against United
States aid to the anti-communist government of El Salvador. Based on CISPES' alleged
links to Salvadoran rebels, the FBI conducted two investigations of CISPES between 1981
and 1985. See notes 56-64 and accompanying text. See generally CISPES and FBI
Counterterrorism Investigations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitu-
tional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 116-20 (1988)
[hereinafter House Subcomm. Hearings on CISPES] (testimony of FBI Director William S.
Sessions); THE FBI AND CISPES, REPORT OF THE SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, S.
REP. No. 46, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1-7 (1989) [hereinafter SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMM. REP.
ON CISPES]; The FBI Investigation of CISPES: Hearings Before the House Permanent
Select Comm. on Intelligence, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 5-6 (1989).
12 "[T]his year's authorization bill does, in fact, reflect the beginning of a process to
reorder priorities and objectives of U.S. intelligence activities." SENATE COMM. ON INTELLI-
GENCE, INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1991, S. REP. No. 358, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1990) [hereinafter SENATE INTELLIGENCE Comm. REP. No. 358]; see also
136 CONG. REC. S12299-12302 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1990) (comments by Chair and Vice Chair of
Senate Intelligence Committee); HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, INTEL-
LIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1991, H.R. REP. No. 725, PART I, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess. 4-5 (1990) [hereinafter HOUSE INTELLIGENCE COMM. REP. No. 725] (shift of intelli-
gence community's focus away from Soviet threat toward other national security concerns).
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and the end of the Cold War.1 3 It is time for a similar rethinking
and reordering of priorities and resources domestically-starting
with the FBI.
The Cold War had a home front. For nearly fifty years, the
United States maintained a domestic security apparatus based in
part on the belief that foreign ideas posed as real a threat to our
nation as foreign armies. Focusing on ideology, the apparatus often
assumed that opposition to government policies sprung not from
the thoughtful convictions of American citizens, but from foreign
instigation; expressions of political support for the goals of violent
insurgencies abroad were thus understood to manifest an intention
to use violence in this country.
Quite contrary to our professed belief in the self-reliance and
good sense of an informed American public, the security apparatus
reflected a fear that domestic institutions and public opinion could
be subverted easily by foreign influence. Any contact between an
American and a representative of certain nations or factions, as the
theory went, was a potential avenue for subversion. Therefore, all
contacts required scrutiny. This concept was reiterated as recently
as February of 1988, when, in a report justifying its Library Aware-
ness Program, the FBI stated, that "[T]he FBI must logically pur-
sue any contact between a Soviet national and an American citi-
zen, regardless of where the contact occurs or the profession of the
person contacted, and that would include libraries as the circum-
stances might require.' 14
For much of this period, the Soviet Union and communism
were seen as the greatest possible threat. In response to White
House pressure the intelligence community scrutinized opponents
of the Vietnam conflict and supporters of nuclear arms control for
evidence of foreign direction or manipulation. 5 More recently, for-
" See supra note 12 (legislative materials examining need for reordering priorities of
U.S. intelligence agencies); see, e.g., Maynes, America Without the Cold War, 78 FOREIGN
POL'Y 3, 13 (1990) (discussing priorities of post-containment foreign policy); Lardner, CIA
Struggles to Define Its Post-Cold War Role, Wash. Post, Nov. 13, 1990, at Al, col. 1 (debate
over new intelligence priorities); Moynihan, The Peace Dividend, N.Y. Rev. of Books, June
28, 1990, at 3 (Cold War's termination offers opportunity to move from national security
state to a more open government).
14 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE KGB AND THE
LIBRARY TARGET, 1962-PRESENT 32 (February 1988), reprinted in FBI Library Visits, supra
note 6, at 277; see infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text (discussion of Library Aware-
ness Program).
'5 CHURCH COMM. REP. BOOK III, supra note 9, 679-732; Public Papers of the Presidents
of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1982, Book II 1455, 1595 (1983); 129 Cong. Rec.
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eign insurgency and terrorism (often allegedly Communist-inspired
or Soviet-supported) have provided added justification for the con-
tinuation-and indeed, expansion-of the domestic security appa-
ratus. Groups that opposed United States foreign policy in Central
America have undergone investigation on the ground that they
were acting on behalf of rebel groups.1"
I strongly disagree that communism, terrorism, or any other
anti-democratic ideology has ever seriously threatened a nation
confident in its own democratic values; I just as strongly dispute
that it was ever necessary to curtail freedom in order to protect it.
But certainly neither the premise nor its corollary should serve as
the basis for policy today. Whatever might be the threat from the
Soviet Union or any other nation or group in the foreseeable fu-
ture, the threat is not ideological. Communist or revolutionary ide-
ology no longer exerts a sinister attraction, if ever it did; and the
American public no longer needs to be protected from contacts
with Communists-Soviet or Cuban-Palestinians or foreigners of
any national or ideological stripe.
Not only has the theoretical basis of the domestic Cold War
lost its force, but it would seem that purely pragmatic considera-
tions would make it impossible for the FBI to maintain the type of
approach typified by the Library Awareness Program or the pro-
gram that included the interviews of Amnesty International mem-
bers; too many contacts exist between United States citizens and
foreign nationals for the FBI to scrutinize each one in search of
spies or terrorists. For instance, five years ago, 7,600 Soviet visitors
came to the United States. In 1988, approximately 35,000 arrived.
In 1989, the number of visitors rose to nearly 60,000, and should
have approached 100,000 in 1990.17 The number of visitors from
the People's Republic of China is even greater. The task of moni-
toring all these visitors and their contacts with Americans, an ef-
fort that was probably spotty when the numbers were far smaller,
has become logistically impossible.
Throughout much of its history, the FBI has been able to find
authorization for a broad counterintelligence mission in direc-
tives-however vaguely worded-from successive Presidents and
Attorneys General, as well as in signals from Capitol Hill. Those
H1793-97 (Mar. 24, 1983).
16 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
17 FBI Oversight-1991, supra note 1, at 439.
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directives had no explicit basis in statute or the Constitution, but
it would be a mistake to argue that the FBI today is acting ille-
gally. My concern is that the FBI claims that its foreign counter-
intelligence and international terrorism responsibilities encompass
the authority to investigate the first amendment activities of
Americans not suspected of criminal conduct; there is no clear
statutory or constitutional limitation on the source for, or the
scope of that authority. I believe, however, that legislative limits,
through the use of a criminal standard, offer the best hope for de-
fining the FBI's authority and keeping it focused on crime, not
ideology.
I am not proposing that we leave ourselves defenseless; no one
wants to jeopardize the nation's security against hostile foreign in-
telligence efforts or international terrorism. Rather, the reforms
outlined below would make the FBI more effective and would bet-
ter protect the nation because resources would be focused on genu-
inely dangerous activity: espionage and acts of violence.
The coincidence of the Cold War's end and the bicentennial of
the ratification of the Bill of Rights should provide the opportu-
nity to clarify finally the FBI's mission and the government's
power over the political activities of its citizens. In an era of vastly
expanded East-West exchanges, it is absurd to contend that the
FBI "must logically pursue any contact between a Soviet national
and an American citizen" to identify espionage threats or ter-
rorists. The end of the Cold War offers an opportunity to break the
link between ideology and national security, and finally to direct
the domestic counterintelligence apparatus away from ideology to
criminal activity. This "peace dividend" will not be manifested in
budgetary terms but rather in a releasing of the nation from gov-
ernment policies that have constricted freedom of speech and asso-
ciation in the name of protecting those freedoms from foreign
assault.
II. PROPOSED EXPANSIONS IN THE FBI's COLD WAR POWERS
Ironically, rather than refocusing the priorities of the FBI in
light of the Cold War's end, we are confronting proposals to ex-
pand the mission and powers of the national security apparatus.
The war with Iraq posed serious threats to civil liberties, as has
international conflict throughout American history. Some of the
early steps taken by the FBI were disturbing. On January 7, 1991,
a week before the United Nations deadline for Iraqi withdrawal
[Vol. 65:59
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from Kuwait, FBI agents across the country began to visit Ameri-
can citizens of Arabic heritage to ask whether they knew of
planned terrorist activities.18 Many of those interviewed were polit-
ically active and some were asked questions about their support of
the war.19 The FBI began a separate effort to locate Arab nationals
who had overstayed their visas, which raised concerns, thus far un-
realized, about broader contingency plans for detention of aliens.
20
Even before Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the intelligence com-
munity was busy identifying new threats, based on an expanded
definition of national security, that would justify the continued ex-
istence of the Cold War apparatus. For example, within the past
four years, we have seen the increasing use of the intelligence agen-
cies in the war on drugs. Now government and academic sources
have argued that the warming of relations with Moscow requires
an expansion, rather than a diminution of intelligence efforts.21
There is now discussion of involving the intelligence agencies more
extensively in the collection of economic intelligence, and using the
FBI to combat foreign efforts to obtain high-tech information.2
One commentator has gone so far as to suggest that the CIA
should begin covering environmental issues!
23
According to a press report, in October of 1990, President
Bush signed National Security Directive 147, directing the FBI
and other intelligence agencies to continue "rebuilding" their
counterintelligence programs. Reportedly, the secret five-page di-
rective was based on a year-long interagency review of security
threats and vulnerabilities.24
The Senate Intelligence Committee, rather than seeking a re-
Belkin, For Many Arab-Americans, FBI Scrutiny Renews Fears, N.Y. Times, Jan.
12, 1991, at 1, col. 4; LaFraniere, FBI Starts Interviewing Arab-American Leaders, Wash.
Post, Jan. 9, 1991, at A14, col. 1.
19 LaFraniere, supra note 18.
20 Such treatment of Arab-Americans raises the spectre of the internment of Japanese
Americans during World War II. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944)
(upholding Executive Order restricting from West Coast all those of Japanese ancestry, re-
gardless of citizenship or loyalty); cf. Matsuda, No Business as Usual: Racism and Gender,
3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM (forthcoming 1991) (likening current efforts against Arab-Ameri-
cans to internment of Japanese Americans during second World War).
21 Lardner, supra note 13.
22 See HousE INTELLIGENCE Comm. REP. No. 725, supra note 12, at 5; SENATE INTELLI-
GENc E CoMM. REP. No. 358, supra note 12, at 10.
23 Carver, Intelligence in the Age of Glasnost, 69 FOREIGN AFF. 147, 155 (1990).
24 Gertz, Despite Thaw in Cold War, Bush Heats up Counterspy Operations, Wash.
Times, Oct. 24, 1990, at Al, col. 4.
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allocation of resources from less critical and less productive efforts,
recently urged the Administration to seek a supplemental appro-
priation to provide additional resources for the FBI's fiscal year
1991 counterintelligence program to meet the requirements for im-
plementation of arms control inspection agreements.2 5
The FBI seeks broadened authority to use the so-called "na-
tional security letter" to obtain-without a warrant-phone
records and credit records on persons suspected of being agents of
foreign powers, even if they are not suspected of being involved in
illegal activities. This information would allow the FBI to identify
even more contacts between Americans and Soviets, leading to
even more fruitless visits of innocent citizens.
A panel of experts recently presented to the Senate Intelli-
gence Committee a report on proposed changes in the counterintel-
ligence laws.26 The panel recommended expanding the use of the
polygraph,2 7 requiring employees with special security clearances
to waive their privacy rights, and authorizing a secret court to ap-
prove physical searches ("black bag jobs") without probable cause
to believe that a crime has been committed. The panel also en-
dorsed the FBI's request for broader authority to obtain credit re-
ports and telephone toll records without a subpoena where no
criminal conduct was suspected.2
III. SOURCES OF-AND LIMITS ON-THE FBI's AUTHORITY
In 1978, Attorney General Griffin Bell testified that "[d]espite
its long history, the Bureau has received very little statutory guid-
ance."2 Unfortunately, that remains unchanged; there is no legis-
lative charter for the FBI. As when Attorney General Bell testified,
there are now only three provisions defining the FBI's duties.30
25 SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMM. REP. No. 358, supra note 12, at 8.
28 Letter of Eli S. Jacobs to David L. Boren & William S. Cohen, Chair and Vice-Chair
of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (May 23, 1990) (transmitting thirteen legis-
lative proposals "to improve the counter-intelligence of the United States").
2- Cf. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2006(b) & (c) (1988) (exempting federal government from prohibi-
tion of polygraph use in employment setting when performing intelligence or counterintel-
ligence functions).
"s See Senate Hearing on Counterintelligence, supra note 26.
2 FBI Statutory Charter: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1978) (testimony of Attorney General Griffin B. Bell).
20 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 533, 534 (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 3744 (1988); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 535,
540 (1988) (Attorney General and FBI may investigate crimes involving government
employees).
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These provisions authorize the FBI to detect and prosecute of-
fenses against the United States, assist in the protection of the
President, investigate matters under the control of the Department
of Justice and Department of State,3 1 collect crime records and ex-
change them with federal, state, and local agencies,32 and provide
training for state and local law enforcement. A fourth statutory
provision authorizes FBI agents to carry firearms, serve warrants,
and make arrests.33
The substantive espionage laws3 4 provide some guidance for
the FBI's counterintelligence investigations. But the Bureau has
long pursued a broader mission in which it has examined lawful
contacts between citizens of the United States and those of certain
foreign nations; it has also investigated the lawful activities of do-
mestic groups that oppose United States foreign policy or "sup-
port" certain foreign governments or factions. It is not the FBI's
fault that this mission was never well defined; the mission
stemmed from a vague series of presidential directives predating
World War II, statutes of questionable constitutionality such as
the seditious conspiracy law, and Attorney General guidelines clas-
sified as "secret."35
The first substantial domestic intelligence programs of the
federal government s were established during World War I, when
thousands of individuals were investigated by the Bureau of Inves-
tigation for "un-American activities." In the period immediately
following World War I, the investigations continued, culminating
in the notorious Palmer Raids.3 7
An effort to narrow the FBI's focus was made by Harlan Fiske
31 See 28 U.S.C. § 533 (1988) (Attorney General may appoint investigative officials).
82 See id. § 534 (Attorney General shall acquire crime identification and other records).
s See 18 U.S.C. § 3052 (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 3744 (1988) (FBI director authorized to
establish training programs).
", See 18 U.S.C. §§ 791-798 (1988) (espionage and censorship chapter makes unlawful,
inter alia, to harbor spies, gather defense information, and photograph defense
installations).
See infra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
88 See CHURCH COMM. REP. BOOK H, supra note 9, at 23-67; FBI Oversight: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judi-
ciary Part II, 94th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 167-68 (1976) (citing GENERAL ACCOUNTING OF-
FricE, FBI DoMEsTIc INTELLIGENCE OPERATIoNs-THEm PURPOSE AND SCOPE: ISSUES THAT
NEED TO BE RESOLVED); see also Socialist Workers' Party v. Attorney Gen., 642 F. Supp.
1357, 1375-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (summary of history relating to FBI's investigation of SWP).
'7 See generally Comment, Ideological Exclusion, Plenary Power, and the PLO, 77 CA-
LiF. L. REV. 831, 837-39 (1989) (discussing Palmer Raids in which aliens were deported).
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Stone, who became Attorney General in 1924. Describing the Bu-
reau's activities before he took office as "lawless, maintaining many
activities which were without any authority in federal statutes, 38
Stone pledged to limit the FBI to investigating only such conduct
as is made criminal by the laws of the United States. Upon ap-
pointing J. Edgar Hoover as acting director of the Bureau of Inves-
tigation (as the FBI was then called), Stone directed that the activ-
ities of the Bureau were to be "limited strictly to investigations of
violations of the law."39
The constraints imposed by Stone were never embodied in leg-
islation and proved to be short-lived. Beginning in the mid-thir-
ties, domestic intelligence activities were reinstituted and ex-
panded. President Roosevelt, in a series of oblique and conflicting
orders, directed the FBI to collect intelligence about "subversive
activities" and "potential crimes. '40 In the exercise of this jurisdic-
tion, the FBI's activities went beyond investigation of crimes to
scrutinize foreign involvement in American affairs. The FBI began
to investigate law abiding domestic groups and individuals.
The intelligence programs of the FBI did not cease with the
end of the second World War. Instead, they set a pattern for de-
cades to come. Executive directives by Presidents Truman and Ei-
senhower continued to direct the FBI to investigate "subversive
activity" without defining what that might be 41 and President
Kennedy took actions that continued the Truman and Eisenhower
orders.42 The FBI concluded that its internal security responsibil-
ity went beyond statutory authority. In the 1960's and 1970's, in-
telligence gathering related to protest activity was generally in-
creased in response to vague requests by Presidents, Attorneys
General, and other officials. 43
In addition and parallel to the executive orders described
above, the FBI has found authority to conduct intelligence investi-
gations in a number of broad criminal statutes that may be of
questionable constitutionality. 44 In the past, the FBI has con-
" CHURCH. COMM. REP. Book II, supra note 9, at 23.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 24.
41 Id. at 45-46.
4 Id. at 46.
4' Id. at 46-163.
, See 18 U.S.C. § 2384 (seditious conspiracy); id. § 2385 (advocating overthrow of gov-
ernment-Smith Act); id. § 2386 (Voorhis Act) (1988); 50 U.S.C. §§ 781-789 (1988) (Internal
Security Act of 1950 and Communist Control Act of 1954). But see Scales v. United States,
[Vol. 65:59
REORDERING PRIORITIES OF THE FBI
ducted massive investigations of lawful political activity premised
on the violation of conspiracy statutes such as the Smith Act and
Voorhis Act, which facially punish speech and advocacy.
Despite the revelations regarding COINTELPRO and other
excesses, and contrary to the recommendations of the Church
Committee, legislation was never adopted to define the FBI's re-
sponsibilities. Consequently, the source of the FBI's authority is
still based on Executive Order and Attorney General guidelines,
and the FBI continues to claim authority to investigate legal activ-
ities of United States citizens.45
Two sets of Attorney General guidelines were adopted after
the investigations of the Church and Pike Committees: one con-
cerned domestic intelligence or domestic security, and the other
concerned foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, and interna-
tional terrorism. 46 The former are unclassified; the latter remain
largely classified.
In one of the most significant reforms to emerge from that era,
the Attorney General guidelines on domestic security cases
adopted a criminal standard.47 The standard currently provides:
A domestic security/terrorism investigation may be initiated
when the facts or circumstances reasonably indicate that two or
more persons are engaged in an enterprise for the purpose of fur-
thering political or social goals wholly or in part through activities
367 U.S. 203, 224-30 (1961) (membership clause of Smith Act which makes it felony to be-
long to organization which advocates overthrow of government held not to violate first or
fifth amendments); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 303-11 (1957) (convictions for con-
spiring to organize group advocating overthrow of government reversed-word "organize"
should be strictly construed); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516 (1951) (sections of
Smith Act which make it crime to advocate overthrow of government do not violate first or
fifth amendments); United States v. Rodriguez, 803 F.2d 318, 320 (7th Cir. 1986) (seditious
conspiracy statute held not to conflict with treason clause of Constitution), cert. denied, 480
U.S. 908 (1987).
" It would be incorrect to argue that nothing has changed since COINTELPRO. See
supra note 9. The reforms adopted following the investigations of the Church and Pike
Committees represent genuine improvements in the operations of the FBI and brought
about significant reductions in the level of resources devoted to ideological subversion. For
example, congressional oversight investigations of the past decade have uncovered none of
the "dirty tricks" that characterized COINTELPRO.
" See infra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
47 See FBI Domestic Security Guidelines: Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
60-66 (Levi guidelines), 67-85 (Smith guidelines) (1983). The guidelines were originally
promulgated by Attorney General Edward Levi in 1976. Although revised by Attorney Gen-
eral William French Smith in 1983 and updated in 1989, the guidelines retain the criminal
standard.
1991]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
that involve force or violence and a violation of the criminal laws
of the United States.48
Since 1976, all investigations of domestic terrorist groups-the
"New Left," Puerto Rican nationalists, the Jewish Defense League,
and white supremacist groups-have been conducted under this
criminal standard. The number of domestic security/terrorism
cases has dropped dramatically, while the success of the FBI's ef-
forts has increased with the more focused approach. The number
of terrorist incidents in the United States has decreased from over
one hundred eleven in 1977 and sixty-nine in 1978, to only nine in
1987, eight in 1988, four in 1989, and five in 1990.11
In contrast, foreign counterintelligence and international ter-
rorism investigations were left under broadly defined standards in
a separate set of guidelines. The guidelines and the Executive Or-
der5" on which they are based permit, under a wide variety of cir-
cumstances, the surveillance of Americans not even suspected of
breaking the law. They reassert precisely the reasoning used by the
FBI for its surveillance of Martin Luther King, Jr. and the anti-
Vietnam War movement.
While most of the Attorney General guidelines on foreign
counterintelligence and international terrorism are classified,
enough of the definitions section is unclassified to appreciate the
scope of th6 authority granted to the FBI. Under the guidelines,
the FBI is authorized to investigate "intelligence activities," de-
fined to include any activity undertaken for or on behalf of a for-
eign power to affect political or governmental processes in the
United States. A foreign power is defined to include a foreign gov-
ernment or any of its component, a faction of a foreign nation, a
foreign-based political organization, and a group engaged in inter-
national terrorism or preparatory activities. 51 The Palestinian Lib-
eration Organization, the African National Congress, the
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front, and opposition politi-
cal parties abroad are thus all foreign powers, and anything done
48 Id. at 79.
11 FBI, ANALYSIS OF CLAIMED TERRORIST INCIDENTS IN THE U.S. (1981); FBI, TERRORISM
IN THE UNITED STATES (1989); see also Data submitted to the Subcommittee on Civil and
Constitutional Rights by the FBI (on file with subcommittee).
11 Exec. Order No. 12333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (1981); see Executive Order on Intelli-
gence Activities: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 101 (1981 & 1982).
" Attorney General Guidelines for FBI Foreign Intelligence Collection & Foreign
Counterintelligence Investigations (April 1983).
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in the United States for or on their behalf is potentially the target
of a counterintelligence investigation. The guidelines expressly
state that no United States person (defined as a citizen or perma-
nent resident alien) may be considered an agent of a foreign power
"solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amend-
ment, '52 but it appears that conclusory allegations based on evi-
dence of foreign influence can suffice to overcome that limitation.
The FBI has interpreted the guidelines as authorizing the in-
vestigation of individuals who are members in or who support a
foreign organization that engages in both legal political and illegal
terrorist activities. As the CISPES case demonstrates, once a group
is deemed terrorist, the FBI does not closely distinguish among the
activities of its members or supporters. The FBI may investigate
one's membership in, or recruitment, fundraising or support for an
organization, regardless of whether one participates in the organi-
zation's illegal activity.53 Such an approach runs counter to the line
of cases in which the Supreme Court has held that the first amend-
ment protects membership in or affiliation with an organization
having both legal and illegal aims, unless the individual specifically
intends to further the group's illegal aims. 4
The definition of international terrorist in the guidelines in-
cludes one who knowingly aids or abets any person engaged in vio-
lent criminal acts. The concept of aiding and abetting was, how-
ever, interpreted by the FBI in the CISPES case to cover a broad
category of "support" activities for groups that are deemed to en-
gage in terrorism, whether or not the support is legal.55 In addition,
52 Id.
11 Congress did little to clarify this issue when, in the Immigration Act of 1990, it de-
fined "engag[ing] in terrorist activity" to mean "commit[ting], in an individual capacity or
as a member of an organization, an act of terrorist activity," including the "soliciting of
funds or other things of value . . . for any terrorist organization. Pub. L. No. 101-649,
§ 601(a)(3)(B)(iii), 104 Stat. 4978, 5070 (1990) (emphasis added) (amending
§ 212(a)(3)(B)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act).
See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 187 (1972); Keyishan v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S.
589, 606-07 (1967). But see Palestine Information Office v. Schultz, 853 F.2d 932, 939-42
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (first amendment not implicated by order shutting down foreign mission's
office funded solely by and representing only one foreign entity). This last case, however,
should not be read as implicitly approving the investigation of groups receiving domestic
funding and representing domestic members.
"1 See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text. In 1984, the FBI carried out an exten-
sive investigation of alleged members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
who were living in Los Angeles. That investigation included secret electronic surveillance
under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. FBI Director Webster testified that the
individuals were not themselves involved in terrorist activities and were not subject to arrest
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a group engaged in international terrorism is by definition a for-
eign power, so political activities undertaken on its behalf-such as
fundraising or leafletting-could fall under the definition of intelli-
gence activities subject to investigation.
Whatever the guidelines' ambiguities, there is now considera-
ble evidence that they have not been narrowed in practice. In
terms of international terrorism, the FBI has not sought to link
domestic subjects to specific terrorist acts abroad and has not
predicated its investigations on suspicion of any criminal activity.
Instead, it has focused on links or associations, sometimes several
stages removed. The result has been the investigation of United
States organizations and individuals whose support for a foreign
group is ideological and legal. In terms of counterintelligence, the
FBI has sought to monitor the collection of even unclassified infor-
mation by foreign governments and the entire range of contacts
between Americans and foreign officials.
IV. RECENT ABUSES OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY
A. CISPES
The FBI has investigated CISPES twice: a preliminary inquiry
conducted in 1981-82 under the Foreign Agents Registration Act,
and a more extensive examination conducted from 1983-85 as an.
international terrorism investigation. As a result of the latter case,
the FBI gathered and added to its files information on approxi-
mately 2,375 individuals and 1,330 groups.5 During the course of
the investigation, which involved all of the FBI's field offices,
agents took thousands of photographs at peaceful demonstrations,
surveilled rallies on college campuses, attended a mass at a univer-
sity, surveilled churches and church groups, sent an informant to
numerous meetings, rummaged through trash, collected mailing
lists, took phone numbers off posters opposing intervention in Cen-
tral America, recorded license plate numbers of vehicles parked
outside public meetings, and obtained long distance billing records
from telephone companies.
for criminal activities, but that the investigation nonetheless was properly predicated under
the Attorney General guidelines. Nomination of William H. Webster to be Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence: Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. 94-95 (1987).
" SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMM. REP. ON CISPES, supra note 11, at 2.
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The investigation produced 178 "spin-off" investigations of
groups and individuals. In four of the group cases, the investiga-
tion appears to have been based solely on the group's ideological
similarity to or association with CISPES.57 Three other groups
were targeted because the FBI believed them to be CISPES chap-
ters, regardless of their different names. The FBI pursued another
group, the Birmingham Committee in Solidarity with Central
America ("BCSCA"), without an initial predicate; moreover, al-
though the file indicated that agents failed to establish any connec-
tion between CISPES and BCSCA, the Birmingham FBI office re-
ceived its headquarter's approval to obtain BCSCA's telephone toll
records because of an assertion that BCSCA was identical to
CISPES.5 8 Spin-off investigations of individuals were apparently
initiated solely on the basis of attendance at the showing of a
CISPES-sponsored film, the appearance of names on lists of par-
ticipants at CISPES conferences, and similar associations. In one
case, the FBI targeted a Xavier University professor on the basis
of an exam question and a speaker that he had invited to class.5 9
Overall, the CISPES investigation and spin-offs generated a
nearly comprehensive picture of grass-roots opposition to United
States policy in El Salvador. It produced no reliable information of
planned violence or other illegal activity.
Widespread probing of lawful dissent occurred despite memo-
randa from FBI headquarters warning field offices to avoid infring-
ing first amendment rights. In July of 1984, more than a year after
the investigation's commencement, headquarters sent a ten page
memorandum to all involved offices "to reiterate ... guidelines and
instructions for these investigations." 60 Headquarters noted that
"some offices have reported information recently regarding politi-
cal statements and political lobbying .... Political activities or
political lobbying... are not, repeat not, targets of this investiga-
tion and should not be monitored. '6 1
With such explicit instructions, how could the CISPES case
have occurred? The answer, in my view, lies in the lack of a clear-
cut focus for FBI counterintelligence and international terrorism
cases. The focus of the CISPES cases was simply not the investiga-
87 Id. at 5, 6-7, 82-84.
I' Id. at 85.
69 Id. at 6.
6o House Subcomm. Hearings on CISPES, supra note 11, at 396-403.
81 Id.
1991]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
tion of crimes; indeed, in the few instances where the FBI received
information concerning possible violent activity, agents failed to
pursue the allegations. Instead, the inquiry expanded in an effort
to identify all possible CISPES chapters, activities, and associa-
tions. While the FBI headquarters advised field offices not to mon-
itor first amendment activities, other memoranda directed agents
to identify CISPES members and activities. Since many CISPES
chapters only engaged in the planning and staging of meetings and
demonstrations, agents in the field were understandably confused.
For example, when its investigation of the local CISPES chapter
turned up contacts with an order of Catholic nuns, the Cincinnati
office asked headquarters "to furnish Cincinnati with guidelines re-
garding investigations of captioned matter, vis-a-vis religious orga-
nizations-specifically the Roman Catholic Church. '62
The Denver office, two weeks after receiving the July 1984
memorandum instructing that political activity should not be
monitored, sent headquarters a memorandum stating "that in spite
of attempts by the Bureau to clarify guidelines and goals for this
investigation, the field is still not sure of how much seemingly le-
gitimate political activity can be monitored. 6 3 The Cleveland FBI
office, on August 29, 1984, circulated a report on a public confer-
ence to be held in Cleveland, sponsored by unions, religious
groups, and CISPES. The Cleveland report listed the planned
speakers at the conference and the topics they would be address-
ing, including "The 1984 Elections" and "Winning the Labor
Movement to Non-Intervention." The memorandum concluded
that "Cleveland plans to follow the progress of the conference.""
Without the guidance of a criminal standard, the headquarters
directives could not effectively prevent the monitoring of political
activity. With only the guidance of broad concepts like "support
for terrorism" or "foreign direction or control," agents would in-
vestigate whatever activities CISPES engaged in: meetings, rallies,
and grass-roots organizing. Restricting surveillance to CISPES'
leaders would not have limited intrusion; it still would have left
the FBI investigating lawful first amendment activities.
Although marked by many management errors, the CISPES
case was not an aberration stemming from mismanagement.
6' Id. at 374.
e' Id. at 406.
14 Id. at 410-13.
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Rather, the CISPES debacle can be traced directly to the lack of a
criminal standard in the investigation of international terrorism.
B. Other Investigations
In addition to CISPES and its spin-offs, other FBI investiga-
tions obtained information on Central American solidarity groups
and foreign policy critics. There was an FBI investigation cap-
tioned "Salvadoran Leftist Activities in the U.S." The FBI investi-
gated "Nicaragua Proposed Demonstrations in the U.S." in eigh-
teen cities. In 1986, a year after the CISPES case was closed, the
FBI Chicago field office reported on peaceful demonstrations held
by the Pledge of Resistance as part of a fie captioned "Nicaraguan
Terrorist Matters."6 5 The FBI opened an investigation of the Latin
America Support Committee after the CISPES case was closed."'
C. Surveillance of Demonstrations
The Senate Intelligence Committee noted in its report on the
CISPES investigation that "[a]n undetermined but substantial
amount of information about protest demonstrations by a wide
range of groups across the ideological spectrum is acquired, main-
tained and disseminated by the FBI without active investigation.
Many if not most of the demonstrations pose no threat to public
safety. '67
The FBI collected some of this information under specific in-
vestigations, as in the CISPES case. It obtained other information
under a general case classification for investigations concerning
civil disobedience and demonstrations. Between 1959 and 1976, the
FBI created over 34,000 files at headquarters (although not all
cases have to be referred to headquarters). Since 1976, when the
Levi guidelines took effect, activity in this classification decreased
dramatically. Since 1976, only 763 files have been opened."
D. 1990 GAO Report
Immediately after learning the scope of the CISPES investiga-
6 Id. at 435; see also SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMM. REP. ON CISPES, supra note 11, at
80-86.
" Doyle, Fresno Group Probed by FBI, Fresno Bee, Jan. 29, 1990, at Al.
" SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMM. REP. ON CISPES, supra note 11, at 5.
" Letter from FBI director William S. Sessions (Dec. 18, 1989) (on file with Subcom-
mittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights).
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tion in early 1988, I requested the General Accounting Office
("GAO") to audit the FBI's international terrorism program. This,
the first independent examination of the Bureau's international
terrorism investigations, was for the purpose of revealing whether
the CISPES case was an aberration, as the FBI claimed, or
whether it reflected broader issues in the FBI's approach to inter-
national terrorism.69
The GAO 70 found that between January of 1982 and June of
1988, the FBI opened and closed about 19,500 international terror-
ism cases. In ninety-nine percent of the closed cases, the investiga-
tive record filled only one or two file folders, indicating that the
investigation was not extensive.7 1 But the existence of 19,500 cases
over a six and one-half year period, even if most were limited to
one or two volumes of information, means that the FBI collected
as many as 30,000 volumes of data on groups and individuals.
The GAO's most significant finding relates to the number of
cases that were opened on subjects who were not suspected of be-
ing directly involved in terrorist activity. Of the 158 cases that the
GAO examined in detail, forty-four percent contained no allegation
"' The following statistics on international terrorism, based on reports and testimony
by the FBI, may provide a context for the GAO report:
There have been no terrorist acts carried out in the United States by international
groups since 1983, when 11 of the 31 recorded incidents were attributable to international
groups. In 1982, 15 of 51 terrorist incidents in the United States were by international
groups.
The FBI has claimed credit for preventing 22 terrorist incidents by international groups
from 1982 through 1988. This figure reflects some estimation. For example, the FBI claims
credit for preventing three incidents in November of 1984 when it arrested a group of In-
dian Sikhs who allegedly were plotting the assassination of the Indian Prime Minister and
another Indian official visiting the United States, and also estimates that three incidents
were prevented in December of 1984 when the Department of State expelled a Libyan diplo-
mat who was encouraging pro-Qadhafi students to carry out acts of violence against Libyan
dissidents.
Since late 1984, the FBI has had jurisdiction to conduct investigations of terrorist inci-
dents against United States citizens outside the United States. In 1985 and 1986, the FBI
conducted four terrorist investigations outside the United States.
70 See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: FBI INVESTIGATES Do-
MEsnc ACTIVITIES TO IDENTIFY TERRORISTS (1989) [hereinafter GAO REPORT], reprinted in
Subcomm. Hearings on FBI Investigation of First Amendment Activities, supra note 4, at
112-57.
7 Most-nearly 68%-of the FBI's international terrorism cases are closed because no
evidence was uncovered linking the subject to international terrorism or terrorist acts. Id. at
115. This further reinforces the finding that most of the FBI's cases do not involve the
investigation of actual terrorists, but rather involve the pursuit of allegations or suspicions
later found to be unsubstantiated. In another 22%, the cases "were closed because the sub-
ject moved or could not be located." Id. at 117.
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of the individual's criminal behavior or membership in a terrorist
group, but only a suspicion of the subject's association with or link
to a terrorist group.72 As in the CISPES spin-offs, the predicate
link was sometimes very tenuous-the subject attended a meeting
or had a contact with a group or an individual. s In one case, the
FBI opened an investigation on a group simply because it was
named in a brochure distributed by another group already under
surveillance.
The GAO also found that the FBI monitored meetings, dem-
onstrations, religious services, or other first amendment activities
in eleven percent of the 19,500 international terrorism cases. This
would mean that at least 2,000 investigations were undertaken be-
tween 1982 and 1988 where the FBI monitored first amendment
activities. 4
Moreover, in reviewing actual case files in seventy investiga-
tions whose only basis was the subject's suspected association with
or link to a terrorist group, the GAO found the FBI inspecting first
amendment activities seventy-four percent of the time. Thus, in
cases opened without a criminal predicate, the FBI was most likely
to monitor first amendment activities.
E. Amnesty International
In 1989, Amnesty International provided my subcommittee
with documentation showing that over the past two years the FBI
had interviewed over two dozen Amnesty members who had writ-
ten to diplomatic establishments of the Soviet Union and other
Communist countries. Those interviewed included school teachers,
doctors, business professionals, housewives, students, and govern-
ment employees. With one exception, all had written to Soviet or
East Bloc embassies on behalf of political prisoners. 5
The interviews lasted anywhere from a few minutes to an
hour. In several cases, FBI agents telephoned or visited people at
work. Many of those interviewed found the agents were polite and
unintimidating, but many also sensed an implication of wrongdo-
72 Id. at 131.
71 See, e.g., id. at 133-35 (discussing five cases where basis for investigation was attend-
ance at meeting, participation in religious services, or being listed in foreign newspaper
article).
74 Id. at 132-33.
" Subcomm. Hearings on FBI Investigation of First Amendment Activities, supra
note 4, at 112.
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ing. Given that FBI agents generally conduct interviews by asking
open-ended questions and avoiding the disclosure of how the con-
tact came to the Bureau's attention, the Amnesty members faced
vague questions such as, "Have you been in contact with any Sovi-
ets lately?" Many of those interviewed expressed both confusion
and anger that the FBI would scrutinize their human rights work.
Several said that they worried about the adverse effects on their
employment. In one case, the FBI agent had characterized his in-
terview as an educational visit. In other cases, the interviewees felt
that they were being lectured by the FBI agents or warned that
their efforts could be exploited by the Soviets. In all cases, the visit
or interview resulted in an FBI file on the Amnesty member.76
As part of the same effort, the FBI has interviewed children
doing school projects, grammar school teachers, and citizens unaf-
filiated with any group." One citizen in Ohio wrote to tell me that
for many years he had been writing to foreign embassies in Wash-
ington, usually to voice his opinion about what he considered to be
unfair, repressive, or disagreeable policies of foreign governments.
In October of 1988, an agent from the Cleveland office of the FBI
paid him a visit at his place of work to inquire about the general
purpose of such letters and to discover the type of work in which
the subject was involved. 8
F. Library Awareness Program
It was revealed in 1988 that the FBI had regularly visited pub-
lic and university libraries and, in the name of foreign counter-
intelligence, sought information regarding the readers of unclassi-
fied technical and scientific journals.7 9 The visits fell under two
justifications: a systematic program in New York City designed to
develop counterintelligence awareness among librarians at techni-
cal and scientific libraries, and visits to libraries around the coun-
try when the FBI believed that a foreign national under their at-
tention may have used the library. Both justifications comported
with the FBI's assumption that its authority and responsibility ex-
tend even to the investigation of the lawful activities of certain for-
" Id. at 9-15.
71 The Center for Constitutional Rights in New York also has collected reports of FBI
visits.
11 Letter on file with Subcommittee.
79 See FBI Library Visits, supra note 6, at 1.
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eign nationals. With such a broad underpinning, it is not surprising
that the program led to incidents in which FBI agents asked li-
brarians to be wary of "foreigners" or persons with "East Euro-
pean or Russian-sounding names."
G. Chilling Effect
There is a chilling effect when the FBI sends agents to ques-
tion people as to their political activities. The word generally circu-
lates quickly among the other members of a politically active group
that the FBI has been to visit somebody, and has asked about a
trip to Nicaragua, or about the group's activities, membership, or
funding.
While the FBI may respond that its intent is not to intimidate
nor even to conduct interviews in a threatening manner, its agents'
visits may chill the exercise of first amendment rights.80 This can
reduce the level of political activities in which the group's mem-
bers engage. Asking Americans why they have had a facially legiti-
mate contract with a foreign national turns the presumption of in-
nocence on its head. Americans should not have to account to the
FBI for their actions unless the FBI suspects criminal behavior on
their part.
V. A PROPOSED RESPONSE: H.R. 50
I have therefore proposed legislation81 (along with my
colleague John Conyers, Jr.), that would apply a criminal standard
to all of the FBI's investigative activities targeted at United States
citizens and permanent resident aliens. The criminal standard is
already a tested feature of the FBI's domestic security program.
Since 1976, the FBI has adhered to a criminal standard in all of its
investigations of domestic terrorism, opening and pursuing an in-
vestigation only when it has reason to believe that a crime has
been, is being, or will be committed. Under this standard, the Bu-
reau has been highly successful in identifying and arresting mem-
bers of violent groups.
8o An FBI memorandum of September 1970 evidences the FBI's awareness that its in-
terviews could inhibit first amendment activity. The memorandum stated that such ques-
tioning could "enhance the paranoia in these circles and will further serve to get the point
across that there is an FBI agent behind every mailbox." See Socialist Workers' Party v.
Attorney Gen., 642 F. Supp. 1357, 1389 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (quoting FBI memorandum).
"' H.R. 50, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REc. E69 (1991) (my floor statement intro-
ducing bill).
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The criminal standard is objective. It grounds the FBI's activi-
ties in the criminal statutes, not the vague and sometimes classi-
fied Executive Branch directives. It has specific goals-arrest and
prosecution-and produces definitive results-convictions-which
are obtained only after a court's scrutiny of the case. The adoption
of a criminal standard for all investigations of Americans will give
the FBI's counterintelligence program the focus now lacking. The
result could be the reallocation of a considerable portion of the
FBI's resources to more pressing criminal matters, such as the sav-
ings and loan debacle.
H.R. 50 would require the FBI to follow a criminal standard in
opening and conducting cases that may relate to the collection of
information invoving first amendment rights. Our bill would estab-
lish in legislation a simple principle: The Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation should not be monitoring first amendment activi-
ties-interviewing letter writers, visiting libraries, taking pictures
at demonstrations, collecting leaflets and publications-without
some direct relevance to the investigation of criminal activity. H.R.
50 would require the FBI to define the scope of its investigations of
Americans with greater specificity.
The criminal standard in the Levi guidelines has not ham-
pered the FBI in its effort to keep domestic terrorism under con-
trol. To the contrary, the FBI has succeeded in making important
arrests and putting members of dangerous domestic terrorist
groups in jail. The FBI should adhere to the same standard in in-
vestigating international terrorism.
The legislation would not hinder the FBI from acting to pre-
vent terrorist acts before they occur. Under H.R. 50, if the FBI
receives credible information that an individual or group intends
to carry out illegal acts, the Bureau could investigate. The CISPES
case occurred in. part because the Bureau lacked clear guidelines
on how to investigate groups that "support" terrorism. H.R. 50 has
a simple rule: The FBI can investigate any support activities that
are illegal. The FBI, however, would not be free to investigate
broadly a United States group that "supports" a foreign entity our
government has labeled terrorist if the domestic group itself is not
engaged in illegal activity.
Not only does the bill adopt the FBI's own standard applica-
ble to investigations of domestic terrorism (followed with great
success since 1976), but its protection extends only to the investi-
gation of "U.S. persons," defined as United States citizens and per-
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manent resident aliens. Therefore, under the bill, the FBI would
be able to continue investigating all activities, including lawful first
amendment activities, of foreign nationals. Thus, the bill gives the
FBI the latitude to monitor Soviet nationals or Arab nationals
even in the absence of a reasonable belief that a law was being
violated.
In appearances before House and Senate committees examin-
ing the CISPES case, the Director of the FBI testified that the
secret Attorney General guidelines under which the FBI operates
did not contain sufficient guidance and specificity concerning the
investigation of groups that "support" international terrorism. 2
While the Justice Department responded to this problem by
amending the guidelines, I believe that their changes were inade-
quate. The proposed legislation would provide that guidance and
specificity by establishing a criminal standard for all FBI investi-
gations that may involve surveillances of the exercise of first
amendment rights. It would more clearly define the words "aiding
or abetting" in the current Attorney General guidelines, 83 thereby
specifying that the FBI can investigate domestic group activities
that implicate the first amendment only if the activities involve
illegal conduct.
The proposed legislation also provides that once the FBI
opens an investigation, it may seek to gather only information rele-
vant to federal criminal offenses. Thus, in predication and in
scope, the bill would explicitly tie the FBI's counterterrorist and
counterintelligence investigations of American citizens to the crim-
inal laws.
The bill also addresses the question of the proper treatment of
a closed file in which the FBI improperly collected information on
first amendment activities. The legislation would require the FBI
to dispose of the records in a manner that protects the individuals
whose names appear in those files. It would prohibit both the cir-
culation of the records within the Bureau and their dissemination
without the Bureau except to requesters under the Freedom of In-
formation Act and the Privacy Act. The records would thereby be
preserved for historical purposes and be available to the record
subjects, who have a right to know the surveillance to which they
were subject.
82 House Subcomm. Hearings on CISPES, supra note 11, at 143.
83 See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
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In addition to reforming the FBI's mission in this new era,
other necessary steps to end the Cold War at home include:84
1. Reduce the amount of information that is classified and
kept from the American public in the name of national security.
Fundamental to our concept of democracy is the existence of an
informed public. Yet the federal government classifies millions of
pages of information on critical policy matters and criminalizes its
public disclosure. In 1985, the staff of my subcommittee found that
a large percentage of classified information was classified need-
lessly.85 The right to classify and deny the release of information
rests largely on executive orders. Congress should enact legislation
that clearly limits the categories of information that can be classi-
fied. As a start, the guidelines governing FBI investigation should
be declassified.
The budgets of the intelligence agencies and the Pentagon's
procurement programs also should be declassified, so that the
American public can learn how their taxes are being used. Simi-
larly, much of the economic intelligence collected from open
sources should be declassified and made available to American
businesses and corporations. I note in this respect that Senator
Moynihan has introduced legislation to make public the overall
budget amount of the intelligence community, as well as to abolish
the Central Intelligence Agency and transfer its functions to the
Department of State.8 6
2. Establish clear standards and due process rights for secur-
ity clearance determinations. Over three million government and
private sector employees are required to obtain and maintain se-
curity clearances as a condition of employment. Under obscure
standards that originated in the 1950's, employees are required to
undergo intensive scrutiny of sexual, financial, physical, and
mental health aspects of their lives. Yet government employees are
not entitled to a hearing when a decision is made to deny or revoke
84 Morton Halperin and Jeanne Woods of the Center for National Security Studies
have outlined some of these steps in their article "Ending the Cold War at Home," 81
FOREIGN POL'Y 128, 138-43 (1990-91).
" Preliminary Joint Staff Study on the Protection of National Secrets (Oct. 25, 1985),
reprinted in Protection of Classified Information: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Civil Service of House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service and the Subcomm. on Civil
and Constitutional Rights on the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 44
(1987).
88 See S. 236, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REc. S987 (daily ed. Jan. 17, 1991) (re-
marks of Senator Moynihan).
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a clearance.
It is well recognized that spies are rarely motivated by ideol-
ogy; security clearance decisions are more frequently based on non-
ideological grounds such as drug use, alcohol abuse, or financial
need. Yet most components of the defense community still make
security decisions without due process. The legitimate need for the
government to evaluate the trustworthiness of employees in sensi-
tive positions can be satisfied without infringing the due process
rights that our nation generally recognizes as the guarantees of
fairness, accuracy, and reliability.
3. Eliminate ideologically-based restrictions on international
travel. The rights of Americans to be exposed to persons and ideas
from abroad are restricted in two ways: the exclusion of foreigners
seeking to visit the United States, and limits on the ability of
Americans to travel abroad.
Despite congressional action in recent years to eliminate many
of the ideological exclusions in the McCarran Walter Act,87 the
government still excludes, usually under the rubric of terrorism,
foreigners who have not engaged and are not expected to engage in
illegal activity. Members of the Palestine Liberation Organization
are specifically excepted from the new reforms and are still ex-
cluded under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Under an Ex-
ecutive Order issued by President Ronald Reagan in 1985, most
Cubans and Cambodians are barred entry to this country as well.88
Throughout much of the Cold War, the government declared
entire countries off-limits by prohibiting the use of United States
passports for travel. Although in 1978 Congress amended the Pass-
port Act to prohibit the imposition of area restrictions on political
grounds, the Executive Branch continues to use the economic em-
bargo laws to ban travel by Americans to certain countries. Today,
travel to Cuba, Libya, Vietnam, Cambodia, and North Korea is
still severely restricted.
Restrictions on the ability of foreigners to visit the United
States or of United States citizens to travel abroad are incompati-
ble with the purposes of the first amendment and should be elimi-
nated in their entirety.
4. Prohibit warrantless searches. The Executive Branch as-
serts that it has the inherent power to break into homes without a
87 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1557 (1990).
" See Proclamation No. 5377, 50 Fed. Reg. 41,329 (1985).
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warrant or notice-even when it lacks probable cause of any crimi-
nal conduct.89 Congress should firmly declare that there is no na-
tional security exception to the fourth amendment.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Cold War is ending, offering immense opportunities for
freedom-promoting changes in the international order. During this
crucial time, we must reexamine and revise the controls that the
United States government exercises, in the name of national secur-
ity, over its own citizens. We must not allow the Persian Gulf War
to distract us from this task.
For most of this century, America's domestic intelligence
agencies, primarily the FBI, have been given wide latitude to oper-
ate. The resulting surveillance of peaceful political activities that
are not only lawful, but protected under the first amendment, con-
stitutes an invasion of civil liberties that is now clearly without
justification.
During the Cold War, communism was viewed as a real threat
to the survival of our society. The supposed vulnerability of the
United States-a vulnerability which I believe never existed-was
cited as justification for government intrusiveness. Communism no
longer poses an immediate threat to the foundations of the United
States. The end of the Cold War offers a timely opportunity to
discard legislatively the philosophy that justified such surveillance
and to adopt solid legal protections against its reemergence.
We must reexamine the role that domestic surveillance should
play in this new era of international relations. For both theoretical
and practical reasons, counterintelligence operations targeting for-
eign nationals and their contacts with American citizens cannot
continue under a Cold War mentality. We must dislodge such in-
telligence actions from their secure realm of secrecy and expose
them to greater scrutiny from the American citizens whose liber-
ties they affect. Regaining the civil liberties lost in the Cold War
may be the most precious peace dividend of all.
81 See Exec. Order No. 12333, supra note 50.
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